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You can’t watch an NFL game today that you don’t see one or both of the teams using the now “so-called” “Wildcat Offense.” It is almost an obligatory formation that you have to run, or risk being accused of not being on the cutting edge of offensive football in the NFL.

Some have even suggested that this may be the new direction of offensive football in the NFL. I respectfully disagree. In fact, it has no chance at all for a couple of well-proven reasons.

First, the speed of the league and the athleticism of its players, when schemed properly, make this style of play obsolete. It is great as a “change-up” and a “trick” formation, but as a staple that teams can prepare for on a regular basis — it has no chance of sustaining itself.

Secondly, to run this offense consistently you would need a cadre of players, in addition to those needed to actually compete in the NFL. This is prohibitive based on the current 53-man roster limit in the league.

Thirdly, those who have seen the formation and prepared adequately (AKA Baltimore, Pittsburgh and Tennessee) have shut it down. Without a legitimate passer at the QB position, solid defensive teams are simply matching up one-on-one with the receivers and committing the rest of the defense to a run only approach that makes it prohibitive to run the offense. Even if they are suspect at the corner position and don’t match up with the receivers, the limitations of the running back in the quarterback position make it problematic that they could effectively challenge the secondary with any semblance of a legitimate passing attack.

Finally, to adapt the style of play with an “athletic” quarterback that could effectively pass and run from this style of play can not be sustained. No quarterback in this or any other league could get through the grueling NFL four preseason games, 16 regular season games and subsequent playoffs. Like the earlier observations, you would have to carry a group of quarterbacks that run this style of play that would be prohibitive given today’s roster limitation.

The Miami Dolphins deserve a great deal of credit for initiating this go-round of the old ‘Delaware Wing T” offense. But to intimate that this is anything more than an interesting changeup or fashionable fad of “trick oration” is absurd. Even if someone wanted to commit to this style of play it would suffer the same fate in the NFL as did the Run-and-Shoot. It might generate some interesting numbers but will not win consistently.

As I go around the league visiting different coaches it is embarrassing the number of guys who want to take credit for first introducing these concepts into the NFL.

For those interested, the following is a history, capably laid out from a number of different sources on the internet about the inception and evolution of this style of play.

The wildcat offense, (or wildcat formation) a variation on the single-wing formation, is an offensive scheme that has been used at every level of the game. The general scheme can be instituted into many different offensive systems, but the distinguishing factor is a direct snap to the running back.

The precursor to the scheme for the Wildcat formation is named the “Wing-T“, and is widely credited to being first implemented by Coach Tubby Raymond and Delaware Fightin’ Blue Hens football team. Tubby Raymond later wrote a book on the innovative formation.

The virtue of having a running back take the snap in the Wildcat formation is that the rushing play is 11-on-11. (Although different variation has the running back hand off or throw the football) In a standard football formation, when the quarterback stands watching, the offense operates 10-on-11 basis.

The 2008 Miami Dolphins have implemented the Wildcat offense beginning in the 3rd game of this year with great success. The Dolphins started the wildcat trend in the NFL lining up either running back Ronnie Brown (in most cases) or Ricky Williams in the shotgun formation with the option of handing off or throwing. Through ten games, the Wildcat has averaged over seven yards per play for the Dolphins.

As the popularity of the Wildcat spread during the season, several teams have begun instituting it as a part of their playbook, including the Kansas City Chiefs, Chicago Bears, Carolina Panthers, Atlanta Falcons, Cleveland Browns and Arizona Cardinals and several others. Many teams admit to spending an inordinate amount of time having to prepare for such schemes.

Among coaches, single-wing football denotes a formation using a long snap from center as well as a deceptive scheme that evolved from Glenn “Pop” Warner’s offensive style. Traditionally, the single-wing was an offensive formation that featured a core of four backs including a tailback, a fullback, a quarterback (blocking back), and a wingback. Linemen were set “unbalanced,” or simply put, there were two linemen on one side and four on the other side of the center. This was done by moving the off-side guard or tackle to the strong side. The single-wing was one of the first formations attempting to trick the defense instead of over-powering it.

Pop Warner referred to his new offensive scheme as the Carlisle formation because he formulated most of the offense while coaching the Carlisle Indians. The term single-wing came into widespread use after spectators noticed that the formation gave the appearance of a wing-shape. In 1907, Warner coached at Carlisle, a school for Native Americans, where his legacy consisted of at least three significant events. The first was the discovery of Jim Thorpe’s raw athletic ability. The second was the use of an extensive passing game that relied on the spiraled ball. Finally, faking backs who started one way, but abruptly headed the opposite way, kept defenses guessing.^[Because Jim Thorpe had so much raw talent, Coach Warner more than likely designed much of his single-wing offense around this gifted athlete. Thorpe, the proverbial triple threat, was a good runner, passer, and punter.

For much of the history of the single-wing formation, players were expected to play on both sides of the ball. Consequently, offensive players often turned around to play a corresponding location on defense. The offensive backs played defensive backs, just as the offensive linemen played defensive linemen. Unlike teams of today, single-wing teams had few specialists who only played on certain downs.

College football playbooks prior to the 1950’s were dominated with permutations of the traditional single-wing envisioned by Warner.

Two-time All-American Jack Crain’s handwritten playbook clearly denotes how the University of Texas ran their version of the single-wing circa 1939-1940. University of Texas Coach Dana X. Bible ran a balanced line, which means that there were the same numbers of linemen on each side of the center. Also, the ends were slightly split.

Slightly splitting offensive ends, called flexing, was in widespread use by Notre Dame’s Box variation of the single-wing. Knute Rockne’s Notre Dame Box offense employed a balanced line, which had 3 linemen on each side of the center. Another Rockne innovation was a shifting backfield that attempted to confuse the defense by moving backs to alternate positions right before the snap. Another variation of the single-wing saw the quarterback move out as a wingback on the weak side. Besides adding different blocking angles for the quarterback, the double-wing formation facilitated the passing game. Stanford had a variation on the double-wing where the quarterback stayed right behind the strong side guard, while the tailback became the wingback to the weak side. The Fullback, being the only deep back left, took all the snaps and directed the plays.

The advent of the T formation in the 1940’s led to a decline in the use of Single-wing formations. For example, the single-wing coach Dana X. Bible, upon his retirement in 1946, saw his replacement, Blair Cherry, quickly install the T formation like many other college coaches of the day. However, the single-wing style of football is still practiced by a small group of teams across the country, almost exclusively at the high school and youth level. The Pittsburgh Steelers were the last NFL team to use the single-wing as their standard formation, finally switching to the T formation in 1952. On September 21, 2008, the Miami Dolphins utilized a version of the Single Wing offense (”wildcat”) against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced four touchdowns in a 38-13 upset victory and again two weeks later defeating the San Diego Chargers.

The direct snap or toss from the center usually went to the tailback or fullback; however, the quarterback could also take the ball. The tailback was very important to the success of the offense because he had to run, pass, block, and even punt. Unlike today, the quarterback usually blocked at the point of attack. As with his modern day counterpart, a single-wing quarterback might also act as a field general by calling plays. The fullback was chosen for his larger size so that he could “buck” the line. This meant that the fullback would block or carry the ball between the defensive tackles. The wingback could double-team block with an offensive lineman at scrimmage or even run a pass route^.

The single-wing formation was designed to place double-team blocks at the point of attack. Gaining this extra blocker was achieved in several ways. First, the unbalanced line placed an extra guard or tackle on one side of the center. Second, a wingback stationed outside end could quickly move to a crucial blocking position. Third, the fullback and especially the quarterback could lead the ball carrier producing interference. Finally, linemen, usually guards, would pull at the snap and block at the specified hole. Line splits were always close except for ends who might move out from the tackle.

The single-wing formation depended on a center who was skilled both at blocking and at tossing the ball from between his legs to the receiving back. The center had to direct the ball to any of several moving backs, with extreme accuracy, as the play started. Single-wing plays would not work efficiently if the back had to wait on the snap because quick defensive penetration would over-run the play. The center was taught to direct the ball to give the tailback or fullback receiver a running start in the direction that the play was designed to go. The single-wing formation was a deceptive formation with spectators, referees, and defensive players often losing sight of the ball. A backfield player, called a “spinner,” might turn 360 degrees while faking the ball to the other backs, or even keeping the ball or passing it. Defensive players were often fooled as to which back was carrying the ball.

The one play that was unique to the single-wing formation was the buck-lateral. The terminology for this series of plays associates the word “buck” with the intent of the fullback to plunge into the line. In addition, the short toss, or lateral of the ball, can be made to the quarterback or wingback who may take the ball and do other maneuvers including passing the ball. Consequently, when the fullback takes the ball, he appears to be headed to buck the line. Typically, fullbacks were bigger players who ran plays intended to smash the defensive front. The fullback’s initial move pulls the defensive players toward the expected point of attack. Next, the fullback tosses the ball to another back causing the defense to change pursuit angles, thus losing a step in their catching the ball carrier.

The strong side of the formation, where the extra lineman and wingback lined-up, put pressure on the defensive end. Defenses might move extra players to that side or shift the whole defense to compensate. The cut-back play could succeed regardless of how the defense reacted. The cut-back play started like a strong side sweep with offensive guards and quarterback running interference for the tailback. The fullback would fake a smash over the guard hole to occupy the defensive tackles. The play was designed to make the defensive end over-react and try to stay outside to contain the runner. If the defensive end gave ground to the sideline, the tailback would cut-back inside to let his interference push the defensive end out of the play. If the defensive end came too far inside, then the ball carrier would run around him to the outside. After the cut-back play was used in a game, then the offense might run the wingback reverse since both plays started out the same way. At the outset, the defense tries to pursue the sweeping tailback. However the tailback delivers the ball to the wingback running the opposite way to the weak side. Both the cut-back and the reverse would be set-up with quick fullback bucks up the middle, which would cause the defensive line to over-protect their gaps, as opposed to pursuing quickly to the sideline.

The single-wing quarterback played a different role than modern-day quarterbacks. While the quarterback may have called the snap count due to his position close to the center of the formation, he may not have called the actual play in the huddle. For much of the history of football, coaches were not allowed to call plays from the sideline. This responsibility may have gone to the team captain. The quarterback was expected to be an excellent blocker at the point of attack. Some playbooks referred to this player as the blocking back. The quarterback also had to handle the ball by faking, handing off, or optioning to other backs.

Although the Single-wing has lost much of its popularity since World War II, its characteristic features are still prevalent in all levels of modern football. They include pulling guards, double teams, play action passes, laterals, wedge blocking, trap blocking, the sweep, the reverse and the quick kick. Many current offenses, such as that of the Florida Gators‘ coach Urban Meyer, use Single-wing tendencies for running plays, while using wide receivers instead of wingbacks. Once a strong running formation, the single wing has been replaced by formations that facilitate passing, while minimizing the running aspect of the game. Today the single-wing has evolved in what coaches call the spread offense or shotgun, with the emphasis on passing. The most noticeable feature that remains of the powerful Carlisle formation is the long toss from center to the main ball-handler. The main talent and field general has become the quarterback instead of the tailback. The other single-wing backs have moved close to the line of scrimmage and are split farther from the main line. Wide receivers are called split-ends, flex ends, slots, and flankers. Also, linemen spacing has increased in distance. Moving offensive players farther apart serves the purpose of also spreading the defense. The goal is to make defenses cover the whole field on every play.